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Medicating the ADA-Sutton v. United

Airlines, Inc.: Considering Mitigating
Measures to Define Disability

I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to common perceptions, a person who is physically or mentally
impaired is not necessarily disabled.' The Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA" or "the Act") protects physically or mentally impaired individuals from
employment discrimination. 2 In order to decide whether the ADA protects an
individual, the individual first must qualify as disabled under the meaning set
forth by the ADA. 3 An individual's impairment is considered a disability if it
substantially limits a major life activity.4 Whether the impairment should be
assessed in its mitigated or unmitigated state is an issue that has long been
debated. 5
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,6 firmly
resolved this debate by determining that all impairments must be assessed in their
mitigated state when considering whether a claimant can successfully prove he or
she has a disability under the ADA.7 The Sutton opinion disentangles nearly a
decade of differing decisions regarding mitigating measures and the ADA.8 In
addition to providing a clear template for deciding what constitutes a disability,
the Court in Sutton affirmed the ADA's congressionally appointed power to limit
the number of claimants who qualify as disabled in America today.9
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton and discuss
its repercussions on future disability discrimination analysis. Part II of this Note
studies the legal history behind the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton and
presents an overview of the application of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") regulations.'" Part III details the facts and procedural

1.

See infra notes 78-115 and accompanying text.

2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (West 2000).
3. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2000).
5. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
6. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
7. See id. at 482.
8. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
9. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84. See Jonathan A. Segal, The Sutton Ruling: More Than Meets
the Eye, 44HRMAG. 1, at 5 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)( 1) (West 2000); see also infra notes 78-115 and
accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 15-62 and accompanying text.

history of Sutton," followed by an analysis of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Part IV. 2 Part V discusses the impact of Sutton on the
courts, Congress, and society at large.' 3 Part VI illustrates the practical impact of
the Sutton Court's ruling."

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The History of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990'" "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."' 6 For this reason, the ADA was organized into five separate titles.
Title I strictly addresses employment matters.'7 Title II regulates state and local
government service provisions and public transportation issues." Title III tackles
the quagmire of public accommodations and services operated by private entities.' 9
Title IV addresses telecommunications issues.2" Title V includes various
miscellaneous provisions including laws regulating building construction,
attorney's fees, removal of state immunity, and congressional compliance.2 Each
of the above titles requires that an executive agency formulate regulations and
interpretive guidance to carry out the specified purpose of the ADA.
Specifically, Title I of the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
against an individual with a disability because of that individual's disability in
employment situations.22 The employment provisions of the ADA were derived

11. See infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 78-148 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 149-218 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (West 2000).
16. § 12101(b)(1). The purpose of the ADA is also "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." § 12101(b)(2). The federal
government is to play a central role in enforcing the requirements of the act. § 12101(b)(3).
17. §§ 12101-12117.
18. §§ 12131-12150.
19. §§ 12181-12189.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (West 2000).
21. 42U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
22. § 12112(a). Title
Iexplicitly
provides that "[n]o covered entity
shall
discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability
because of thedisability
of such individual inregard tojob application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms,conditions, and privileges
of employment." Id.
Under the EEOC regulations, acovered entity
isdefined as "an employer,employment agency,
labor organization, or joint
labor management committee." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(b) (1999). The definition
of an employer is"aperson engaged inan industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees for
each working day ineach of 20 or more calendar weeks inthe current or preceding calendar year ......
§
1630.2(e). An employee is defined as "an individual employed by an employer." § 1630.2(0.
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from Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 197323 ("Rehabilitation Act"), which
continues to prohibit federal government agencies and private organizations that
receive federal funding from discriminating against qualified individuals with
handicaps. 4 Although Congress intended the discrimination analysis within the
ADA to be similar to the analysis of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA broadened
the scope of the Rehabilitation Act by aiming to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities in the private sector, in state and local governmental
agencies, and in the Senate.25
Individuals who wish to bring an employment discrimination claim under the
ADA must sufficiently demonstrate the following: the individual has a disability
within the meaning of the ADA, the individual is qualified for the job with or
without reasonable accommodation, 26 and the individual was discriminated against

The ADA protects an individual ifhe or she is a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). A "'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." Id.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (West 2000). The ADA expressly requires its provisions to be interpreted
in a way that "prevents imposition ofinconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements" under
the two statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b). Congress intended relevant case law developed under the
Rehabilitation Act to be generally applicable to analogous inquiries under the ADA. See H.R. No. 101 485(I), at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
24. See Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Should Courts ConsiderMitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 921
(1998) (stating that before the ADA was enacted, the Rehabilitation Act was the principal statutory shield
for individuals with disabilities); see also Elizabeth A. Chang, Who Should Have it Both Ways?: The Role
of MitigatingMeasures in an ADA Analysis, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1123 at 1125-26 (1998) (stating that the
ADA was not intended to supersede the Rehabilitation Act, just expand its scope). "The Rehabilitation Act
... prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating against otherwise qualified
handicapped persons solely by reason of their handicap." Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determinationof
Disability Under the ADA: Should Mitigating FactorsSuch As MedicationsBe Considered?,35 IDAHO
L. REV. 265, 273 (1998) (explaining the similarities between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, for
example, "the definition of 'handicap' under the Rehabilitation Act parallels the ADA's definition of
'disability').
The scope of the Rehabilitation Act, however, was too limited to effectively remedy
discrimination against the numerous Americans with disabilities because the Rehabilitation Act only
protected federal employees from discrimination. See Walsh, supra, at 921. Congress placed much of the
language from the employment sections of the Rehabilitation Act into Title I of the ADA as a reaction to
the Rehabilitation Act's limitations. See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
25. See Tami A. Earnhart, Note, Medicated Mental Impairments Under the ADA: Diagnosing the
Problem, Prescribingthe Solution, 74 IND. L.J. 251, 253-54 (1988) (noting the ultimate need for the
federal government to play a large part in promulgating and enforcing "consistent standards regarding the
treatment of individuals with disabilities" because of the pervasive nature of "discrimination in major areas
of life such as employment, housing.... education, transportation, communication, [and] recreation").
26. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v. York Int'l Corp.,
45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995)). A plaintiff must describe the reasonable accommodation and
demonstrate that he or she "is able to perform the essential functions of the job." Id.

in an employment decision because of the alleged disability.27 To elucidate the
threshold element of a prima facie case under Title I, Congress provided in the
ADA a three-prong definition of the term "disability."28 "The term 'disability'
means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment."'29 The first prong of the disability definition covers actual
disabilities, while the second and third prongs "include stereotypes, stigmas, and
perceptions that cause people to be treated as if they have a covered disability."'
Within the definition of an actual disability, a physical or mental impairment
is described as any physiological disorder which "affect[s] one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory... cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine."'" Mental disorders such as mental and emotional
illnesses, learning disabilities, and mental retardation are also protected by the
Act.32 Moreover, an impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to
be classified as a disability.33 These categories and definitions serve to narrow the
coverage of the Act; 34 however, the statutory language is still vague because it
appears to include an extraordinarily large group of people within its definition.
Beyond this broadly constructed statutory language, the ADA lacks any indication
as to what represents a disability.35

27. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893,897 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that twin sisters with
severe myopia were not disabled because the sisters were not significantly limited in a life activity by the
alleged disability, thus, disqualifying them from asserting a valid claim under the ADA), affd, 527 U.S.
471 (1999). A discussion of the latter two prongs of a discrimination claim under the ADA is beyond the
scope of this case note. The discussion will be limited to the first and most crucial prong.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
29. Id.
30. John Party, OVERVIEW OFKEYFEDERALDISABILrIYLEGISLATIoN, INREGULATION, LTIGATION AND
DISPUTE RESOLUION UNDER THE AMERICANs wrTi DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTmONER'S GUIDE TO

IMPLEMENTATION 3 (1996).
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
32. § 1630.2(h)(2).
33. § 1630.2(g)(1).
34. See generally,William Brent Shellhorse, The Untenable Stricture: Pre-MitigationMeasurement
Serves to Deny Protection Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 177
(1998).
35. See Walsh, supra note 24, at 925.
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B. Interpretingthe ADA: The EqualEmployment OpportunityCommission
Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines
The language of the ADA does not expressly state whether a claimant
qualifies as disabled under the statute.36 One year after the enactment of the ADA,
Congress vested in the EEOC the authority and responsibility to issue regulations
to clarify any ambiguities in the ADA for courts and claimants.37 Congress

36. See Sheryl Rebecca Kamholz, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Advocating Judicial
Deference to the EEOC'S Mitigating Measures Guidelines, 8 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 99, 100 (1998)
(recognizing that the EEOC interpretive guidelines correctly interpret the ADA regarding the role of
mitigating measures).
37. See Walsh, supra note 24, at 922-23 (directing EEOC to issue regulations for the ADA (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630 (1998) and 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (West 2000)). The EEOC is the executive agency within
the United States government charged with overseeing the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in
employment. Ronald D. Wenkart, Commentary, Public Employment, Reasonable Accommodation and
the ADA, 133 EDuc. L. REP. 647, 651 (1999) (stating that Congress has the power to order such agencies
to issue regulations to be considered by courts when courts interpret provisions in the United States Code).
Congress did notexplicitly define the terms "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits,"
or "major life activities," which appear within the ADA's definition of "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Therefore, the EEOC seized the responsibility to define a "physical or mental impairment" to include:
Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting
one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or [any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific leaming
disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(l)-(2) (1998). The regulations provide that a disability "substantially limits" a
major life activity if the person with the disability is:
Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity.
§ 1630.2(j)(l)(i)-(ii).
Whether an individual is "substantially limited" in a major life activity is determined
considering "[tihe nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and [tihe permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment." § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). Major life activities include functions such as
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." § 1630.2(i). Regardless of the definitions the EEOC regulations supply, regulations promulgated
by agency are only binding on courts if Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue by mandating
the regulations, and the regulations constitute an acceptable construction of the statute in question. See
Walsh, supra note 24, at 923-24 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (stating that if authority to clarify a particular provision of the statute through regulation is
expressly delegated, it is given deference unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the
statute")). Thus, the judicial branch of government decides whether Congress has delegated authority to
an agency, but an agency's interpretation of the United States Code controls if it is within the scope of such

possesses the power to give administrative agencies, such as the EEOC, the duty
to regulate its acts pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.3" In Chevron, the Court provided
that "[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created.., program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."39
The EEOC took the Court's statement in Chevron literally and constructed
interpretive guidelines in the appendix to the Code of Federal Regulations to
further assist in interpreting the terms of the ADA.4' Unlike the EEOC
regulations, however, Congress did not request the EEOC to produce these
guidelines.4' In view of the fact that the EEOC interpretive guidelines are not
congressionally mandated, the guidelines are binding on courts only to the extent
that the courts unequivocally adopt the interpretation of the agency.42
Nevertheless, the controlling weight of these interpretive guidelines in
determining what constitutes a disability has been the source of intense debate in
the federal court system since the announcement of the guidelines in 1991. 4 At
the heart of this debate is the provision stating that the determination of whether
an individual is "substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a
case-by-case basis without regard to mitigating measures."" According to the
EEOC guidelines, in employment discrimination cases where a claimant's
impairment is controlled by a mitigating measure, such individuals have
disabilities under the ADA even if they do not experience, and have never

delegation. See Jonathan Bridges, Note, Mitigating Measures Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
Interpretationand Deference in the Judicial Process, 74 NorRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1073-74 (1999)
(noting that the courts must perform Chevron's two-step test for determining whether deference to a
particular agency's interpretation of law is appropriate).
38. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
39. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). If the policy by
the EEOC is a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were under the agency's care, a
reviewing court should not disturb it unless it appears from a reading of the statute or the legislative history
that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned. See id. at 845 (citing United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
40. See Erica Worth Han-is, Controlled Impairments under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A
Sea rchforthe Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575,579 (1998) (citing the EEOC interpretive
guidelines at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1997)).
41. See Walsh, supra note 24, at 923-24.
42. See id.
43. See id., at 932; see generally Bridges, supra note 37 (summarizing the disparate views of many
federal court cases throughout, some adherent in their analysis to the interpretive guidelines, otherschoosing
to ignore the guidelines); see also Elizabeth A. Crawford, The Courts' Interpretationsof a Disability
Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Are They Keeping OurPromise to the Disabled?,35 Hous.
L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1998) (noting that the Interpretive Guidance constitutes a body of experience and
informed judgment, which courts may use for guidance).
44. Wenkart, supra note 37, at 651 (stating that mitigating measures such as medicines and prosthetic
devices should not be considered when determining the definition of disability). For a complete discussion
of mitigating measures see infra notes 78-148 and accompanying text.

[Vol. 28: 257, 2000]

Sutton v. United Airlines
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

experienced, any limitation from their condition.45 Facing this issue in cases
involving vision impairment,' diabetes,47 hypertension,48 and adult Still's
disease,49 the circuit courts have split, some deferring to the EEOC interpretive
guidelines, others finding the EEOC interpretation converse to the plain meaning
of the term disability in the statute.

C. Interpretive Guidelines Versus PlainMeaning: A Multitude of Cases
Join the MitigatingMeasures Debate
The first analysis of the issue of mitigating measures and their effect on the
definition of disability under the ADA came from the Seventh Circuit in Roth v.
5 ° The Roth court found
Lutheran General Hospital.
that the Plaintiff's vision
impairment had to be assessed without regard to mitigating measures.5 Two years
after Roth, the Sixth Circuit expanded upon the mitigating measures issue in

45. See Bridges, supra note 37, at 1061 n.8 ("A 'controlled impairment' is one that would
substantially limit a major life activity if untreated, but that does not limit any such activity when treated
with some mitigating measure ....
); see also Arthur F. Silbergeld and Rowdy B. Meeks, Federal
Appellate Courts Are Split on How to Treat Plaintiffs with Chronic Health Conditions that Can Be
Mitigated, Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 20 NAT'L L.J., MAY 4, 1998, at B4 (noting that
"[tihe question employers still face is whether disability laws cover employees who use mitigating measures
to control such conditions").
46. See Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995); see also infra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text. But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd,
527 U.S. 471 (1999).
47. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997); see also infra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text; Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1 st Cir. 1998); see infra note 54 and
accompanying text.
48. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 873 (D. Kan. 1996), afftd, 527 U.S.
516 (1999); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
49. See Jones, et al., DisabilitiesMust Be Assessed in Unmedicated State, 11 LA. EMPLOYMENTL.
LEIER 2, at 1(1999) (citing Washington v. HCA Health Servs. ofTex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998),
vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999)); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50. See Roth, 57 F.3d at 1446. Roth applied to become a resident at Lutheran General Hospital. Id.
at 1450. He was denied the job after the extensive interviewing process; Roth sued Lutheran General for
discriminating against an individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. at 1452. Roth did not meet his
burden of establishing that he was disabled within the meaning of the statute..ld at 1453; see also supra
note 28 and accompanying text. This burden was not met because Roth adapted well to daily activities and
possessed the visual capacity to function well in most medical specialties. Id. at 1455.
The Roth court did not take into consideration mitigating measures, deferring automatically to the
EEOC interpretive guidelines. Id. at 1454 (stating that "not every impairment that affects an individual's
major life activities is a substantially limiting impairment") (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)(1999)).
Due to the foregoing reasons, Roth's condition was not found to be substantially limiting, even though Roth
was impaired. Id. at 1458.
51. Id.at1455-60.

Gilday v. Mecosta County. 2 In Gilday, the court determined that deference
should be given to the EEOC's interpretation of the statute.5 3 Subsequent
decisions by the First Circuit' and the Fifth Circuit 5 opined that the EEOC's
interpretation was consistent with the legislative history and purpose of the ADA.56
The mitigating measures debate intensified in Sutton v. UnitedAirlines,Inc., 57
where the aforementioned findings that disability determinations are to be

52. 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the EEOC guidelines correctly interpret the ADA).
53. Id. at 763. The court in Gilday looked to the EEOC guidelines because the ADA is not sufficiently
clear in its definition of disability. See id.
In Gilday, Gilday was forced to control his diabetic condition with the use of insulin, otherwise,
Gilday became immediately frustrated and irritable. Id. at 761. Unlike Sutton and Hinton, who were
simply not hired because they did not meet United Air Lines qualifications for a pilot, Gilday was working
for Mecosta County and was then fired from his position. Id. The Sixth Circuit considered whether Gilday
presented sufficient evidence of a disability to avoid summary judgment on his claim. Id. Discussing the
ADA's definition of disability, the Gilday court decided that the EEOC is consistent with the text and the
purpose of the ADA, and that the legislative history of the ADA strongly supports this reading. Id. at 76365.
However, Judge Cornelia Kennedy's opinion in Gilday maintained that the statutory language of
the ADA is unambiguous and cannot stand to be burdened by a broad agency interpretation. Id. at 766-68
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Kennedy's main propositions for why the
statute should be afforded deference were the following: the EEOC's position on mitigating measures
appears not in the regulations, but in an appendix to the regulations; the EEOC conflicts with the statute
itself; and the statute's plain meaning is unambiguous and should be read as such. Id. at 766-67 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Kennedy admitted that the ADA's legislative history
lended support to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines, however, she qualified that argument as one that was
subsumed by the plain meaning of the statute's text. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)) ("[W]e do not resort
to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.") Judge Kennedy also stated that the legislative
history might be misleading given that Congress did not intend to protect all individuals whose life activities
would hypothetically be substantially limited were they to stop taking medication. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998). In Arnold, the court had
to determine if Arnold was disabled under the ADA, and, if he was, whether the United Parcel Service
denied him employment because of his disability. Id. at 858-59. Arnold suffered from insulin-dependent
diabetes, which he controlled through daily injections of insulin. Id. at 856. The court noted that a
reasonable person could interpret the plain statutory language of the ADA to require an evaluation either
before or after ameliorative treatment. Id. at 859. This ambiguity caused the court to look to the legislative
history of the ADA. Id. The difference in allowing the legislative history to control the outcome of Arnold
is that "Congress spoke directly to the medical condition at issue in this case: 'persons with impairments,
such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity' are considered to have an actual
disability, 'even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication."' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334). The court explained that the
holding in this case was limited to the specific condition diabetes milletus. See id. at 866.
55. See Jones, et al., supra note 49, at I (citing Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152
F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999)). After Washington started work as an
accountant at HCA Health Services, he was diagnosed with adult Still's disease, which he controlled by
taking medication four times daily. Id. The issue before the court was whether an individual claiming a
disability should be assessed in his medicated or unmedicated state. Id. Looking to the legislative history,
the court declined to overrule the EEOC. Id. at 2 (concluding, nonetheless, that it is more reasonable to take
mitigating measures into account).
56. See supra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
57. 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aft'd, 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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evaluated without regard to mitigating measures were rejected. In the opinion, the
Tenth Circuit held the EEOC findings to be in direct conflict with the actual
language of the ADA.58 The court argued that the Plaintiffs' uncorrected vision
only hypothetically limited the major life activity of seeing because the Plaintiffs'
corrected vision allowed them to function similarly to individuals without
impairment.59 Thus, the Plaintiffs were not considered disabled in light of the
statutory language of the ADA.'

58. See id. at 893; see also supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. The ADA states that a
disability must be defined as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 2000). The Plaintiffs argued that,
according to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines, the court should evaluate their vision in its uncorrected
state. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 896. With the aid of such an evaluation, the Plaintiffs argued that they had a
disability under the ADA and were entitled to the ADA's protection. Id. Taking the definition of
impairment from the Roth court above, the court in Sutton found the Plaintiffs established that their severe
myopia was a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 899-900 (quoting Roth v.
Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995))("If the underlying disorder or condition makes
worse or diminishes in a material respect any of the enumerated body systems of the individual, then it
should be considered an 'impairment,' regardless of whether the individual compensates for this worsening
or diminishment by corrective measures.").
The Plaintiffs in Sutton utilized corrective measures to mitigate their severe myopia. Id. at 895.
Because the court considered this mitigating measure, the court reasoned that there was no substantial
limitation on a major life activity, and the Plaintiffs were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Id.
at 902-03. The court further stated that ifa court does not consider mitigating measures in the assessment
of the impairment, it cannot truly evaluate the actual impact of the disability. Id. at 903; see generally
Katherine A. Stanton and Thomas A. Caswell, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct as it Relates to
Employment in Aviation Industry: NavigatingThrough UncontrolledAirspace, 64 J. AIR L. & COM. 459
(1999). See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902-03 (stating that "while Plaintiffs' uncorrected vision would
undoubtedly 'substantially limit' their major life activity of seeing, this is a hypothetical situation").
"Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways." Id. at 903. The court stated that the Plaintiffs were either disabled
because their uncorrected vision substantially limited their major life activity of seeing, and they were not
qualified individuals for a pilot position with United, or they were qualified for the job because their vision
was correctable and did not substantially limit the major life activity of seeing. Id.; see also Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872,878 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that defendant was trying to have
it both ways by claiming he was disabled due to hypertension, but that it was controlled so that he could
adequately perform the job), affd, 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
59. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902-03 (stating that "while Plaintiffs' uncorrected vision would
undoubtedly 'substantially limit' their major life activity of seeing, this is a hypothetical situation").
"Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways." Id. at 903. The court stated that the Plaintiffs were either disabled
because their uncorrected vision substantially limited their major life activity of seeing, and they were not
qualified individuals for a pilot position with United, or they were qualified for the job because their vision
was correctable and did not substantially limit the major life activity of seeing. Id.; see also Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 878 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that defendant was trying to have
it both ways by claiming he was disabled due to hypertension, but that it was controlled so that he could
adequately perform the job), affd, 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
60. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906. In Sutton, the Tenth Circuit also dealt with the third prong of the
disability definition by questioning whether United regarded the Plaintiffs as disabled. Id. at 903. For the
definition of disability under the ADA, see 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (West 2000).The EEOC regulations provide
three ways an individual is "regarded as" being disabled: the individual "[hias a physical or mental

The Supreme Court's decision in Sutton ends the uncertainty that had plagued
the lower courts since the inception of the ADA. 6' By aligning the disparate
methods of statutory interpretation with recent case law, one of the original
purposes of the ADA-"to provide consistent, enforceable standards
on
62
discrimination against individuals with disabilities"-becomes a reality.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts
In 1992, twin sisters, Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, applied for
commercial airline pilot positions with United Air Lines, Inc. ("United"). 63 Both
Sutton and Hinton met United's basic pilot employment requirements and, after
submitting their applications for employment, were invited to interview with
United.' During their interviews, Sutton and Hinton were informed that they had

impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constituting such limitation;" the individual "[has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;" or the individual
"[hias none ofthe impairments defined in [29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)( 1)-(2) (1999)], but is treated by a covered
entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(l)-(3) (2000). "Thus, [a]
person is 'regarded as' having an impairment that substantially limits the person's major life activities when
other people treat that person as having a substantially limiting impairment ....Sutton, 130 F.3d at 903
(citing MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)).
The court observed that United did not regard the Plaintiffs as having an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity because the Plaintiffs only showed that their impairment prevented them from
working a single job, not a class ofjobs. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 904-05. For an individual to demonstrate that
an impairment substantially limits the major life activity of working, an individual must show "significant[]
restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j)(3)(i).
A "class of jobs" is defined as "[A] job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an
impairment, and the number and types ofjobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within
that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). The definition of a "broad range ofjobs in various classes" is, in pertinent part, "[tihe
job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types
ofother jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from
which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).
Nevertheless, "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Thus, the Plaintiffs in Sutton were not
specifically precluded from a class of jobs. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 904.
61. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that mitigating measures should
be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(2); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471.
63. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895. At that time, Plaintiffs were commercial airline pilots for regional
commuter airlines. Id.
64. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76. The Plaintiffs were eligible for employment at United because they
met United's "basic age, education, experience, and FAA certification qualifications." Id. The Plaintiffs
were also invited by United to participate in several flight simulator tests. See id. at 476.
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been invited mistakenly because Sutton and Hinton did not meet United's
minimum uncorrected visual acuity requirement for pilot positions.65
Sutton and Hinton both suffer from severe myopia; their uncorrected vision
is 20/200 in the right eye, and 20/400 in the left eye.' With the use of corrective
glasses or contact lenses, however, each has vision that is 20/20 or better.67 Due
to their failure to meet United's vision requirement, neither Sutton nor Hinton was
offered a pilot position."

B. Opinionsof the Lower Courts
Relying on the EEOC's interpretation of ADA Title I regulations, Sutton and
Hinton responded to United's rejection by filing a charge of disability
discrimination with the EEOC under the ADA.69 Sutton and Hinton alleged that
United discriminated against them in United's hiring process because of Sutton
and Hinton's disability, or, in the alternative, that United regarded them as having
a disability.7"
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Sutton
and Hinton's claims, stating that Sutton and Hinton had failed to state a claim that
they were disabled under the ADA because Sutton and Hinton's impaired vision
did not substantially limit them in any major life activity.7 In the decision, the
court refused to expand disability protection beyond the scope of the ADA to
include individuals, like Sutton and Hinton, whose vision is wholly correctable.72

65. See id. United's minimum visual acuity requirement was 20/100 or better in both eyes. See id.;
see also Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895 (explaining that United's pilot positions are considered global airline pilot
positions generally in the commercial airline industry).
66. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895 (explaining that severe myopia is tantamount to acute nearsightedness).
67. Id.; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (stating that each Plaintiffcannot see to conduct many daily
activities such as driving, watching television, and shopping).
68. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see also Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895. Sutton and Hinton specifically alleged that due to their
severe myopia they actually have a substantially limiting impairment or are regarded as having such an
impairment. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476; see also Sutton, 130 F.3d at 895.
71. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, *1, *6 (D. Colo., Aug.
28, 1996). Sutton and Hinton claimed no restrictions on their life activities other than their inability to gain
employment as airline pilots for United. Id. at *3. They did not allege any medical restrictions either. See
id. "Plaintiffs do not allege any activity that they are unable to perform that the average person in the
general population can perform, nor do they state that they suffer from any significant restrictions in any
activities as compared to the average person." Id. (explaining that with the assistance ofcorrective measures
Plaintiffs were able to function identically to individuals without a similar impairment).
72. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 896 (stating that if this court were to expand the scope of the ADA the term
disabled would become meaningless due to the sizeable number of individuals with serious visual
impairments).

The court also refused to rule that United regarded Sutton and Hinton as being
disabled because "[a]n employer's belief that an employee is unable to perform one
task with an adequate safety margin does not establish per se that the employer
regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on the employee's ability
to work in general."73
Sutton and Hinton appealed, offering two theories for recovery: "first, that
they were qualified applicants with a disability that substantially limited the major
life activity of seeing; and second, that United regarded them as having an
impairment that substantially limited the major life activity of working."'74
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding in a unanimous decision, similarly relying on a narrow
interpretation of the ADA.75 The court chose to disregard the relevant portion of
the EEOC Interpretive Guidance as inconsistent with the statutory language of the
ADA and held that mitigating measures should be considered when determining
whether a disability substantially limits a major life activity.76
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
issue surrounding whether mitigating measures should be taken into account when
judging whether an individual is disabled under the ADA.77
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

A. The Majority Opinion
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court," commenced her opinion by

73. Sutton, 1996 WL 588917, at *5.
74. Statutory Interpretation-Americanswith DisabilitiesAct-Tenth Circuit Holds that Courts
Should ConsiderMitigatingMeasures in EvaluatingDisability-Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130
F.3d 893 (10th Cir.1997), 111 HARV. L. REV. 2456,2457 (1998) (noting that for appeal Plaintiffs alleged
they were substantially limited in the major life activity of working, not seeing as they had alleged to the
district court).
75. Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906.
76. Id. at 902-03.
77. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477. Due to the similar issues in the following three cases, the Supreme Court
chose to review Sutton v United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), on the same date.
78. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 471. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg joined in the majority opinion. Id. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in judgment.
Id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Breyer. Id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also authored a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting).Justice O'Connor first articulated that the EEOC regulations were not
delegated the authority to interpret the term "disability," therefore, the degree of deference afforded to the
regulations was not necessary to determine the case. Id. at 479-80. The EEOC was delegated by Congress
the ability to issue regulations governing Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (West 2000),
pursuant to § 12116, however, no agency was given authority to issue regulations defining provisions
included in §§ 12101-12102. Justice O'Connor also observed that the amount of deference given to the
EEOC's interpretive guidelines, although the guidelines persuasive force was in dispute, was not integral
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identifying the first issue before the Court as "whether [Petitioners] have alleged
that they possess a physical impairment that substantially limits them in one or
more major life activities."79 Because the Petitioners were not actually disabled
within the meaning of the ADA if mitigating measures were taken into account,
the Court narrowed the discussion of the first issue to whether a disability is to be
determined with or without reference to mitigating measures.8' Having established
this issue, the Court determined that the positive and negative effects of mitigating
measures on a physical or mental impairment "must be taken into account when
judging whether [an individual] is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity
and thus 'disabled' under the [ADA]." 8
The Court first turned its attention to the phrase "substantially limits," noting
that the phrase is written in the present indicative verb form in the ADA statutory
provision, thus, requiring an individual to be presently substantially limited to
prove a disability.8" In other words, to be afforded disability protection within the
ADA, an individual cannot have an impairment that is corrected by mitigating
measures because the impairment would only hypothetically or potentially
substantially limit a major life activity.83 Nonetheless, the Court articulated that
a claimant whose impairment is corrected by mitigating measures is still
categorized as having an impairment.' However, if "the impairment is corrected,
it does not 'substantially limit' a major life activity."85
Next, the Court dismissed the EEOC agency guidelines as divergent from the
plain meaning of the ADA because the guidelines cause courts to speculate about
an individual's possible disability rather than make an individualized inquiry into

to the case. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479-80; see also Walsh, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 481 (citing § 12102(2)(A) (stating the issue technically as "whether Petitioners have stated
a claim under subsection (A) of the disability definition"). The parties referred to as "Petitioners" are Karen
Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, formerly referred to as "Plaintiffs" in their prior case. See Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 475; see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), afTd, 527 U.S. 471
(1999).
80. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480-81. Petitioners alleged that with corrective measures their vision was
20/20 or better. Id. at 475.
81. Id. at 482. The majority in Sutton did not consider the ADA's legislative history. See id. The
dissent considered the ADA's legislative history to bolster the proposition that individuals should be
examined in their uncorrected state. See id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 482.
83. See id. at 482-83. "A 'disability' exists only where an impairment 'substantially limits' a major
life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were
not taken." Id. at 482.
84. Id. at483.
85. Id. InBragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999), theCourt
concluded that whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.

whether an individual has a tangible disability.86 Contesting the agency
guidelines, the Court reasoned that the guidelines create an unfavorable, selfdefeating system where people are not treated as individuals, but instead, classified
as members of a group or class of people with similar impairments.87
The Court's final argument supporting the consideration of mitigating
measures explained that Congress, in drafting the ADA, did not intend the ADA
to protect all individuals whose unmitigated impairments amount to disabilities.88
The text of the ADA lists the number of Americans estimated by Congress as
disabled at 43,000,000,89 and the Court concluded that the number enumerated by
Congress was significantly inconsistent with the over-inclusive definition of
disability for which Sutton and Hinton argued.' The Court also cited to a
different source, which took a nonfunctional approach to defining disability and
states that 100,000,000 Americans have vision impairments, another 50,000,000
have high blood pressure, and more than 28,000,000 Americans have impaired
hearing. 9 Considering the exceedingly high number of impaired Americans, the
Court deduced that protecting all individuals with corrected impairments under
the ADA would extend the protected class beyond the intent of Congress.9'
The Court again relied on a plain reading of the statutory provisions of the

86. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. As an illustration of this principal, the Court stated that, under the
aforementioned view, courts would certainly find all diabetics to be disabled because if the diabetic failed
to administer insulin, they would be substantially limited in a major life activity. See id. However, a
diabetic who is not impaired in his or her daily functions would be considered disabled merely because he
or she has the malady. See id.
87. Id. at 483-84. The guidelines approach also forbids courts to consider negative side effects caused
by the use of mitigating measures when determining whether a disability exists. See id. at 484 (explaining
that the implications would be great if negative side effects cannot be considered because this result would
not be consistent with the individualized approach of the ADA); see also infra notes 206-211 and
accompanying text.
88. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
89. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(1) (2000)) ("Congress found 'that some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole
is growing older .... '").
90. Id.
91. Id. at 487 (citing NA'nONALADVISORYEYECoUNcL, U.S. DEPT.OFHEALTHANDHUMANSERviCEs,
VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, at7 (1998) (finding that "more than 100 million people
need corrective lenses to see properly") (citing Tindall, Stalking a Silent Killer; Hypertension,Bus. &
HEALTH 37 (1998) (finding that 50 million Americans suffer from hypertension))).
92. Id. The Court reasoned that Congress would have included a higher number in its pre-ADA
findings had it wanted to protect a greater class of individuals. Id. That Congress did not do so evidences
that the scope of the ADA is limited to individuals whose impairments are not ameliorated by corrective
measures. Id.
At oral arguments in April of 1999, the Court expressed frustration at having to interpret the term
disability. See Supreme Court Limits Definitions of Disabilities, LIABILITY WEEK (June 28, 1999)
[hereinafter LIABILITY WEEK]. Justice Scalia noted with sarcasm that "it's sort of nice that more than half
of all Americans can claim the benefits of the Americans with Disabilities Act," also stating "that he
couldn't hold his own job without glasses." Id. Scalia duly stated that "[tihe only limitation in putting on
eyeglasses is putting on eyeglasses," thus refuting the proposition that Sutton and Hinton's extreme myopia
might be substantially limiting and constitute a disability. Id.
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ADA, taking literally the data compiled by Congress when construing the
protected class of disabled individuals under the ADA.93 The specific origin of the
exact number of disabled Americans in Congress' findings was not a matter of
great importance to the majority.94 Instead, the Court found support in the
findings of the drafter of the original ADA bill introduced in Congress in 1988." 5
These findings reported a similar, but even smaller, figure in contrast to the
findings of Congress in the final version of96the ADA: 36,000,000 Americans
suffer from a substantially limiting disability.
Responding to the Court's principal dissent, the majority renounced Justice
Stevens' contention that those individuals who have prosthetic limbs, or use
mitigating measures to control epilepsy or high blood pressure, would be excluded
from protection. 97 Under the majority's reading of the ADA, as long as the
particular individual is substantially limited in a major life activity,
notwithstanding the use of mitigating devices, that individual is disabled.98 The
majority also allowed that an impaired person whose impairment is cured by the
use of mitigating measures still may be "regarded as" disabled by an employer and
thus protected by the third prong of the definition of disability. 9 "The use or
nonuse of a corrective device does not [factor into the determination] of whether
an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations

93. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-84.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 484-85. The Court cited the findings of Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., discussed in a Law
Review article Burgdorfauthored. Id. (citing Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct:
Analysis and Implications ofa Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
434 n.117 (1991)). The Court was staunch in its adherence to the plain meaning of the statute, and,
accordingly, elects to direct its focus away from Congressional intent based on Legislative Hearings on the
ADA. This citation of Burgdorf's article as the seed of the Congressional disability number of 43,000,000,
illustrates the majority's willingness to follow a preliminary, and seemingly magical, finding of fact by the
original drafter of the ADA, rather than bow to a more expansive reading of Congressional intent, which,
arguably, is evidenced by the Legislative Hearings concerning the ADA.
See id.
at 485.
96. See id. at 484-85.
97. See id. at 488 (suggesting the use of mitigating measures does not, by itself, relieve an individual's
disability). See id. at 496, 507-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (illustrating that a diabetic who lapses into a
coma without the assistance of insulin would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform
major life activities without the assistance of medication).
98. Id. at 487-88. By this reasoning the Court ignored the 50,000,000 Americans who suffer from
hypertension. See id. at 487. The Court did not fully admit that high blood pressure, mitigated or
unmitigated, would be substantially limiting. See id. at 488. However, by refusing the dissent's suggestion
that viewing individuals in their corrected state would exclude those individuals from protection, the
majority left room for error. See id. at 487-88. The number of disabled individuals in America could be
much larger than Congress' ADA figure. See id. at 487.
99. Id. at 488.

[particular to the impaired individual] are, in fact, substantially limiting."'" In
sum, the Court determined that the proper statutory reading, pertaining to whether
an individual has a disability under the ADA, is made with reference to mitigating
measures.101
The Court next addressed whether United's vision requirement meant that
United mistakenly believed that Petitioners' physical impairments substantially
limited them in the major life activity of working. °2 The Court noted that the
mere inclusion of work as a major life activity was conceptually dubious because
of the circular reasoning involved in the analysis. °3 Instead, Sutton and Hinton
should have alleged that they were regarded as disabled under the third prong of
the disability definition by stating that they were substantially limited in the major
life activity of seeing."° Sutton and Hinton, nonetheless, supported their claim by
alleging that United's vision requirement was solely based on myth and

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 489-90. Under the statutory definition of the third prong, it is necessary that acovered entity
have misconceptions about the individual. Id. at 489. The covered entity "must believe either that [an
individual] has a substantially limiting impairment that [they really do] not have, or that [an individual] has
a substantially limiting impairment when [such] impairment is not so limiting." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(1) (1999) (explaining that the "regarded as" prong protects individuals from job rejection due to
unfounded employer fears associated with disabilities)).Similar to the Sutton decision, the Court debated
the issue of mitigating measures, as well as the issue pertinent to the "regarded as" prong of the disability
statute in Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
In Murphy, the United Parcel Service fired Murphy because his high blood pressure level was
in violation of the Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulation for commercial drivers. Id. at 518.
Murphy had been on medication for many years. Id. at 519. Unmedicated, his blood pressure was 250/160,
far. The first issue in Murphy was whether the determination of Murphy's disability was to be made with
reference to mitigating measures. Id. at 521. Using the same reasoning the Court employed in Sutton, the
Murphy Court found that the use of mitigating measures should be examined. Id.
The Court also resolved the second issue in its opinion in Sutton. Id. at 521-22. The Court
stated that the United Parcel Service did not regard Murphy as substantially limited in the major life activity
of working because Murphy was precluded only from a particularjob (a UPS mechanic), not a class ofjobs.
Id. at 522. Murphy had many jobs available to him utilizing his skills as a driver. Id. at 523-24.
As in Sutton, Justice Breyerjoined Justice Stevens in dissenting to the majority's holding. Id.
at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens observed that Murphy was unlike Sutton in that Congress
specifically intended severe hypertension to be covered under the ADA, and, consequently, Murphy found
a disability under the ADA. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Stevens mentioned that the case
should be remanded because the lower court did not address an integral issue: whether Murphy was
qualified or "whether he could perform the essential job functions." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
103. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. "[I]t seems 'to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded ...
by reason
of [an impairment, from working with others].., then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the
question you're asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap."' Id. (quoting Tr. Of Oral
Arg. In School Bd. Of Nassau County v. Arline, O.T. 1986, No. 85-1277, P. 15 (argument of Solicitor
General)). The EEOC has also been reluctant to define major life activities to include working. See id.
In fact, the EEOC has suggested that working be considered only as a last resort "if an individual is not
substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.20 ) (1998) (alteration in original)).
104. Id. at 490. The Court believed that because Sutton and Hinton were physically impaired, it was
erroneous of them to assert that their myopia substantially limited them in the major life activity of working.
See id.

272
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stereotype.° 5 The Court stressed that an employer is allowed the autonomy to
prefer some physical characteristics, such as height and build, for particular jobs
as long as employers do not base employment decisions on physical characteristics
that are substantially limiting. 6
Sutton and Hinton further alleged that United's vision requirement for the
positions of "global airline pilot" substantially limited them in the life activity of
working because Sutton and Hinton were precluded from a class of employment. 1
The Court surmised that the position of global airline pilot was simply a single
position for which they did not qualify." 8 Therefore, other employment in the
same class as the position, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor, was available
to Sutton and Hinton. 1° 9
Finally, the Court added that imputing the hypothetical adoption of vision
requirements similar to United's to other airline companies would not affect the
Court's holding."' Sutton and Hinton failed to sufficiently demonstrate that

105. Id.
106. Id. at 490-91; see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (holding that
"individuals with monocular vision are not per se 'disabled' within the meaning of the ADA").
The Sutton Court looked to the EEOC regulations definition of "substantially limits" and
decided that the Petitioners were not significantly restricted in the ability to perform a "class of jobs" or a
"broad range ofjobs" under the aforesaid definition because Petitioners merely alleged that United regarded
their vision as precluding them from the single job of global airline pilot. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-93. The
Court rightly deferred to the EEOC definitions to explain the major life activity of working because there
is no definition anywhere else in the ADA. See id. at 491-92. However, the majority previously noted the
Court's apathy toward giving credence to the EEOC. See id. at 475-82. In Albertson's, Kirkingburg
applied for a commercial truckdriving job with Albertson's. Albertson 's, 527 U.S. at 558. Kirkingburg
was afflicted with a vision condition, and although he had more than a decade of driving experience and
performed favorably during Albertson's road test, he was not certifiable under the DOT's standards. Id.
at 558-60.
The main issue for the Supreme Court in Albertson's was whether, under the ADA, "an
employer who requires as ajob qualification that an employee meet a[] ... federal safety regulation must
justify enforcing the regulation solely because its standard may be waived in an individual case." Id. at 558.
First, the Court held that the monocular vision did not substantially limit Kirkingburg because he had
adjusted completely to his vision impairment. Id. at 565-66. The Court cited its decision in Sutton for the
proposition that mitigating measures must be taken into account to determine whether or not an individual
has a disability within the purview of the ADA. Id.
Similarly, the Court found that Albertson's could screen out the unqualified applicants at will,
unless they were screened out for their substantially limiting impairments. See id.at 568. Unlike the Sutton
case, Albertson's relied on DOT regulations prescribed by the government rather than employment
qualifications required by a private employer. See id. at 570.
107. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490.
108. See id. at 493. "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2j)(3)(i).
109. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493.
110. Id. at 493-94. Sutton and Hinton argued that if the Court were to assume that a large number of
airlines have vision requirements similar to United's, Sutton and Hinton "would be substantially limited in
the major life activity of working." Id. at 493 (citing Brief for Petitioners 44-45). The Court dismissed this

United's vision requirement reflected a belief that United regarded them as
disabled."'

B. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg's principal argument bolstered the majority's contention that
the statutory language does not extend protection to the legions of individuals with
corrected disabilities." 2 In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that
Congress intended individuals protected by the ADA to be limited to a "confined,

and historically disadvantaged, class,"'

3

and not to encompass the "large numbers

of diverse individuals with corrected disabilities... ."'" Justice Ginsburg felt that
to categorize the mass numbers of diverse individuals with corrected disabilities

as a "discrete and insular minority," was counterintuitive to the express intent of
Congress." 5
C. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Breyer." 6 Justice Stevens focused
the beginning of his opinion on the statutory construction of the ADA, faulting the
majority for giving the statute a miserly interpretation rather than being true to the
Act's remedial purpose." 7 Based on the decisions rendered by eight of the nine
Federal Courts of Appeals," 8 and the three Executive agencies that have issued

argument expediently, not allowing the imputation. See id.
Ill. Id. at 494.
112. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
113. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494-95 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7) (1995)).
"The Congress finds that ... individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history ofpurposeful unequal treatment and relegated
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (West 1995).
to a position of political powerlessness in our society ....
114. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 954 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
115. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "Congress' use of the phrase [discrete and insular minority].., is
a telling indication of its intent to restrict the ADA' s coverage to a confined, and historically disadvantaged,
class." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens quipped about Congress' "legislative myopia"
because Congress may not have realized that their limited definition of disability might actually encompass
two to three times more Americans than originally perceived. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 496 n. I (citing Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321,329 (2d Cir. 1998),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 22212 (2d Cir. 2000); Washington v. HCA Health
Servs., 152 F.3d 464,470-71 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage,
Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854,859-66 (1 st
Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933,937-38 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane
v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624,627 (8th Cir. 1997); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21
(1 Ith Cir. 1996); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)). Gilday v. Mecosta
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regulations interpreting the statute,"' Justice Stevens opined that the
determination of a disability must be made without considering mitigating
measures."2 Justice Stevens chastised the majority for scrutinizing the syntax of
121
the statute rather than deferring to a reading of the statute as a whole.
Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of referring to the ADA's
legislative history to remove any doubt concerning the meaning of the statutory
text."E In Justice Stevens's opinion, the Committee Reports and the uniform
agency regulations support the meaning of disability conveyed in the text of the
ADA."2 He discussed how the Senate and House Reports, 4 in addition to the

County, 124 F.3d 760,766-68 (6th Cir. 1997), could also be read as expressing doubt about the majority
rule in Sutton. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, only the Tenth Circuit's holding in Sutton is contrary to the above authority. See Gilday, 124
F.3d at 766-68. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
120. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained that the majority
"charted its own course" by not following the one that has been well marked by Congress. Id. at 513
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
121.
See id. at 498-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's strict reading hinders impaired
individuals who make themselves more employable by mitigating their permanent impairment. Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting). It is Justice Stevens' proposal that the ADA read as a whole inquires into the existence of an
impairment, past or present that substantially limits, or did limit, the individual. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority in the Sutton
opinion, Justice Stevens cited his quote regarding judicial deference to legislative history. See id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)) ("In surveying legislative history we
have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee
Reports on the bill .... ). Arguably, this prior statement was not contradictory to Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion with the Sutton majority because the majority refused to look at the legislative history in deference
to the ADA's plain statutory language. Id. at 483-84.
123. See id. at 500-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124.
Id. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The House Committee on Education and Labor report
states that "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." Id. at 499 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II at 52 (1990)). Justice Stevens, however, did not discuss
that the House Report contains some inconsistencies with the Senate Reports below. Bridges, supra note
37, at 1077. In describing the effect of the "regarded as" prong for disability, the Report ensures that
"persons with medical conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit majorlife
activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions." Id. at 1077 & n. 123
(quoting S. REP. No. 101 -116, at 24 (1989)) (emphasis added).The Report of the House Committee on the
Judiciary states that when determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the
impairment should be considered without the effects of mitigating measures. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 500
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 28-29 (1990) (continuing that a person
with epilepsy is covered under this test, as is a person with minimal hearing)).
Justice Stevens again ignored a possible inconsistency within the legislative history. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). As stated above, the Report clearly states that a disability should be assessed
without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, however, the Report also clearly states that an
impairment is not considered a disability "for the purposes of the ADA unless its severity is such that it
results in a 'substantial limitation of one or more major life activities."' See Bridges, supra note 37, at

EEOC Interpretive Guidance,' 25 the Department of Justice regulations, 26
1 and the
Department of Transportation regulations,'27 have each interpreted the ADA as a
statutory protector for "individuals who have 'correctable' substantially limiting
impairments from unjustified employment discrimination on the basis of those
impairments."' 28
Justice Stevens's focus then shifted to question whether the majority's reading
of the statute would exclude individuals with impairments from statutory
protection that Congress did not intend to exclude.'29 Here, Justice Stevens noted
that the Court prematurely denied the right of Sutton and Hinton to assert a claim
under the ADA.'30 He expressed belief that Congress enacted the ADA, like the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,11 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,32 as remedial legislation and should justly be "construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes."' 33 Justice Stevens analogized the judicial
expansion of those statutes to the necessity for the Sutton Court to "include
comparable evils within [the ADA's] coverage," even when such evils are "beyond
Congress' [express] concern [or contemplation] in passing the legislation." '134 The
35
Court's normal predilection is to broadly construe anti-discrimination statutes. 1
A broad construction of the ADA enables remedial statutes to protect a class of

1078 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990)). Because whether an impairment is severe is
closely related to mitigating measures, the Report created inconsistent obligations by requiring courts to
conduct a case-by-case inquiry into the impairment, and to do so considering the impairment in its
hypothetical state. See id.
125. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
126. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104 (1998)
(providing that a person's disability should be assessed without regard to mitigating measures)).
127. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 49 C.F.R. pt. 37.3 (1998)).
128. Id. at 502-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that a narrow reading of the ADA was
not necessary to avoid the danger of compelling United to hire pilots who might pose a hazard to passengers
because of the considerable burden of proving'a discrimination claim under the ADA. See id. at 504
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) (1999) (noting that an employer may overcome
liability if it demonstrates that the employment criteria arejob related and consistent with business necessity
or if such vision would pose a health or safety hazard)).
130. Id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (1994)).
132. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
134. Id. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Steelworkers ofAm., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193,202-03 (1979) (explaining that Congress first intended only African-Americans to be covered by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, however the Court expanded the meaning to include Hispanic-Americans and
Asian-Americans). See e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976)
(noting that the Court further expanded the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include Caucasians); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,79-80 (1998) (applying the Civil Rights Act to cover claims
of same-sex sexual harassment); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989)
(rejecting the argument that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act should be construed
to cover only organized crime). The "comparable evils" that Justice Stevens sought to encompass are the
vision impairments. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 505-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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individuals previously not contemplated for inclusion into the protected class.'36
Although not all eyesight hindrance is substantially limiting, Justice Stevens
clarified that Sutton and Hinton's 20/200 vision in one eye and 20/400 vision in
the other is substantially limiting if not properly treated. 37 He articulated that an
individual who has such an impairment that is covered by the remedial purpose
of the ADA should be protected against "irrational stereotypes and unjustified
disparate treatment on that basis."' 38
In agreement with the majority, Justice Stevens stated that the ADA mandates
an individualized disability inquiry.'39 Nevertheless, in Justice Stevens' view, the
majority ironically condoned treating individuals as members of a group."n The
majority's "misdirected approach permits any employer to dismiss . . . every
person who has uncorrected eyesight worse than 20/100 without regard to the
specific qualifications of those individuals or the extent of their abilities to
overcome their impairment."'' Justice Stevens also dismissed the theory that a
flood of litigation would result if the courts treated correctable impairments as
disabilities by noting that the Sutton holding was limited in scope. In summary,
Justice Stevens would have held that the Petitioners' impairments were disabilities
covered by the ADA.'43

136. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 507 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Only two percent of the population suffers from such myopia."
Id, (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "So long as an employer explicitly makes its decision based on an
impairment that in some condition is substantially limiting, it matters not under the structure of the Act
whether that impairment is widely shared or so rare that it is seriously misunderstood." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id.at 508 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated his position by agreeing with the majority
that the ADA was designed to deter decision making based on group stereotypes, however, he stated that
the agencies' interpretation of the ADA did not fall into that trap. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). This careful
manipulation of the majority's reasoning was an attempt to discredit the majority's assertion that
considering a disability in an unmitigated state would cause courts to speculate about a hypothetical
condition. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He further asserted that, "[it is just as easy individually to test
petitioners' eyesight with their glasses on as with their glasses off." Id. at 509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens again lambasted the Court's approach, observing
that the Court would ostensibly allow an employer to refuse to hire every epileptic or diabetic that is
monitored by medicine. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 510 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed the facts in Sutton limited the
holding to encompass airline pilot job discrimination. See id. at 510-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens noted that in most strata of the economy, whether or not an employee wears glasses does not matter
to future employers. See id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2. Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, in addition to joining Justice Stevens' dissent,' authored a
brief dissent of his own.' 45 Noting the legislative history, purpose, and structure
of the ADA, Justice Breyer focused on the need to draw a statutory line and to give
the ADA a broad statutory construction.' 46 Justice Breyer also proposed that the
EEOC regulations should be refined to draw finer definitional lines and restrict the
possible proliferation of lawsuits by functioning as a weed-out mechanism for
claims brought without merit.'47 Addressing the majority's concerns about the
EEOC's power to draw these lines, Justice Breyer asserted that Congress wanted
to bestow upon the EEOC the power to issue regulations consonant with the ADA,
expressly for factual scenarios akin to the one in Sutton.'4
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION

A. JudicialImpact
Sutton's main contribution to American disability law is undoubtedly its
textual resolution of the ambiguity that beleaguered the lower courts since the
introduction of the ADA. 49
' Lower courts are now provided with federal precedent
defining the class of impaired individuals who may bring a disability claim under
the ADA. 50 The subsequent question is whether Sutton sufficiently interpreted the
language of the ADA, and whether lower courts will apply the Supreme Court's
definition with uniformity.
Sutton interpreted the language of the ADA to define the term disability as it
appears in the statute without the aid of interpretive guidelines or the legislative

144.

Supra notes 116-143 and accompanying text.

145. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer preferred to be over-inclusive in carrying out
Congress' statutory intent rather than exclude individuals that Congress intended to protect. See id. at 51314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The EEOC could perform these functions for disability
discrimination suits that proved without merit because the EEOC has the power to define the protected class.
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Hearkening back to the majority's questioning of the EEOC's regulationwriting authority, Justice Breyer also believed that the EEOC had the power to regulate the definitions in
the employment sections of the ADA because the subchapters' location within the statute is reflective of the
drafting and not the substantive objectives of the ADA. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (clarifying that the
employment subchapter has definitional language in 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and the initial subchapters 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 and 12102).
148. Id. at 514-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 488 (1999) (deciding that "disability under the Act is to be determined with reference
to corrective measures .... ).
150. See supra notes 80-I I1 and accompanying text.
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history. '5By taking into account mitigating measures, the Court refused to extend
ADA protection to individuals with impairments that, although severe, are not
substantially limiting in a major life activity. 5 2 The Court walked a fine line in
its application of the agency deference guidance it mandated in Chevron U.S.A.
v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.'53 Under the holding in Chevron, if
the intent of Congress is clear, or the agency interpretation is inconsistent with the
plain language of the statute, the matter is over."M However, if the statute is
ambiguous then courts must decide whether the agency's interpretation is based
on a prudent reading of the statute.'55 In Sutton, the Court found the statute's
language unambiguous and the EEOC guidelines in direct conflict with the
purpose of the statute, despite conflicting information mentioned by Congress in
the legislative history of the ADA.'56
The consideration of mitigating measures is likely to lead to an individualized
inquiry into whether a person is eligible to bring a disability claim.'57 It will be
difficult for a person with an impairment to bring a claim under the ADA if, with
the assistance of mitigation, that person is not substantially impaired.'58 However,
the Sutton ruling does not dismiss the possibility that a person might use corrective
devices and still be substantially limited in a major life activity.'59 The Court

151. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
152. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483; see also supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
153. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
154. See generally id. at 844 (1984).
155. See id. at 845-47; see also Shellhorse, supra note 34, at 199 (standing for the prospect that courts
should not focus on mitigating measures when determining disability, thus denying protection to many
disabled persons).
156. See Rob Duston, Supreme CourtDecisions NarrowADA Protections(last visited Nov. 8, 1999)
<http://www.saspc.conart_806.htm> (stating that the Court's interpretation of the EEOC's power "will
have great significance in future cases, since those provisions define not only 'disability' but other critical
terms such as 'reasonable accommodation' and 'undue hardship').
157. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. The Court also asserted that assessing an individual in his or her
unmitigated state forces courts and employers to participate in a guessing game about hypothetically
impaired conditions if the individual is aided by corrective measures. See id. This becomes particularly
problematic if the impaired individual has taken advantage of modem medicine and has a completely
corrected physical or mental condition. See Bland, supra note 24, at 281-82. It should be noted that if
employees do not deal with each potentially disabled person on an individual and un-stereotyped basis, they
are likely to be open to ADA discrimination actions. See James E. Hall, Supreme Court DecisionsRequire
ADA Revision, WORKFORCE, Aug. 1, 1999, at 60.
158. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83; see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
159. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-84. The Court did not illustrate a specific situation where a corrected
impairment would still be substantially limiting. See id. It does seem odd that the majority did not supply
an example to refute the dissent, however, their illustrations concerning prosthetic limbs, epilepsy, and
hypertension are as close as the Court ventured. See id. at 487-88.
The Court could have illustrated, to further append their point, an example where the medication
or mitigating measure is itself substantially limiting. See Harris, supra note 40, at 599. For example, an

remained equivocal on the issue by listing permanent disabilities that may not be
excluded totally in their mitigated form: epilepsy, high blood pressure, and having

a prosthetic limb."6 While considering this issue, the Court may have given
credence to the House Report on the ADA which states that "persons with

impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life
activity are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the
effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.'. 6. It is unlikely that the
holding in Sutton goes so far as to prohibit corrected epilepsy and the use of
prosthetics from being considered disabilities; however, the Court held in Murphy
that corrected high blood pressure did not meet the threshold requirement to be
classified as a disability.'62
The Court in Sutton shied away from drafting a specific list of per se
impairments that would always qualify as disabilities, probably because a definite
list would fail to achieve consensus in all cases. The individualized inquiry into
the severity of the impairments advocated by the majority, however, could "leave

too much room for disagreement and [be] inefficient at the summary judgment
stage. ' Thus, to give full effect to the Court's wishes that Sutton set an easily
enforceable standard of judging disabilities under the ADA, the Court's
consideration of mitigating measures arguably should be applied equally to all
individuals, no matter the severity of the disability."6
Somewhat surprising is the ostensible judicial inconsistency of the Sutton
decision with the Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbot,'65 one year prior to Sutton.
In Bragdon, the Court held that an individual with asymptomatic HIV was covered

individual's medication for schizophrenia could produce dyslexia, thus, substantially limiting that
individual's capacity to learn. See id. The Court did, without example, note that neglecting to take
mitigating measures into account would preclude individuals from claiming disability protection when those
individuals experienced negative side effects. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484; see also supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
160. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 487-88.
16 1. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; see also
Michael J. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the
EEOC'S Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 127 (1998) (reasoning that
courts should defer to the plain language of the ADA and take mitigating measures into consideration when
determining whether an individual is disabled).
162. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. The majority in Sutton believed that individuals
suffering from corrected hypertension would be able to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C), the
"regarded as" prong, however, this would prove to be more difficult for claimants. See Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 488-89.
163. See Isaac S. Greaney, The Practicalhnpossibility of Considering the Effect of Mitigating
Measures Under the Americans with DisabilitiesActof 1990, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1296(1999).
164. See Carolyn V. Counce, CorrectiveDevices and Nearsightedness Under the ADA, 28 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1195, 1233-34 (1998). Simply because myopia can be easily measured by an objective sight test,
and impairments such as epilepsy, diabetes, deafness, and heart trouble are rarer, courts should not favor
those impairments to qualify for disability status because confusion and inefficiency in the courts may be
unfair and overwhelming. See id.
165. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
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by the ADA."6 The Bragdon ruling lead judicial observers to believe that the
Court would interpret the definition of disability broadly; however, as evidenced
by Sutton, this was not the case.
Instead, the Sutton Court relied heavily on Congress' finding that 43,000,000
Americans are disabled.' 67 The Court refused to expand upon the ten-year-old
number, implying that those individuals with corrected vision impairments and
others similarly situated are not part of the "discrete and insular minority" who
have historically been discriminated against. 6 s Congress' 1990 findings exclude
millions of impaired people, many of whom suffer from corrected vision
impairments, because those individuals are too great in number to be considered
a minority. 69 A correctable vision impairment is a vastly different impairment
than asymptomatic IV; nonetheless, in Sutton, the Court sent a sobering message
to future disability litigants by drastically diminishing the scope of its ruling in
Bragdon.70
The Supreme Court ruling in Sutton also defied many United States Courts
of Appeals' decisions;' 71 however, the Court followed the greater weight of case
authority on the matter, whereby employers have won ninety-two percent of the
ADA cases resolved in court.'
In the wake of Sutton, lower courts, with
7
exception, have been able to administer the precedent set by the Court with ease. 1
A select few lower courts insist that Sutton's holding is narrow in its scope,7

166. See id. at 635-37.
167. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
168. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also Harris, supra note 40, at 600 (concluding that under
the "no mitigating measures" guideline, the number of ADA Plaintiffs is steadily increasing)
169. See Harris, supra note 40, at 599-600 (stating that a functional approach to the term disability is
consistent with the legislative purpose). But see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens observed that, contrary to the majority's perception, the Court had observed in a previous case that
a statement of congressional findings was a poor basis for a statutory reading. See id. at 511 (citing Nat'l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994)).
170. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (limiting the individualized inquiry standard in Bragdon).
171. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
172. See Pete Williams, CourtLimits Reach of DisabilityLaw: Poor Eyesight, High Blood Pressure
Not Covered, (June 22, 1999) <http://www.msnbc.con/news/282627.asp> (listing the statistics of ADA
court cases from 1992-1997); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor
Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 99-100 (1999) (enumerating empirical evidence that
"defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases
decided on the merits at the trial court level").
173. See Bland, supra note 24, at 283 (urging the Supreme Court to decide in favor of mitigating
measures so that the issue will be resolved and no longer plague the lower courts).
174. Several cases have either declined to extend the Sutton ruling, or distinguished it outright. See
Fjellstad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 954 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Plaintiff was
substantially limited in the major life activity of working); see also Kolovos v. Sheahan, No. 97-C4542,
1999 WL 1101919, at *3 (N.D. III. Nov. 30, 1999); Morris v. Dempsey Ing, Inc., No. 99 C 3455, 1999
WL 1045032, at *1 (N.D. I11.Nov 12, 1999); Matlock v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:97-CV-2735-D,

striving to give impaired individuals the fullest protection under the ADA. The
majority of lower court decisions, however, have followed the Court's language in
Sutton with uniformity, finding that, in the interests ofjudicial economy, the ADA
protects only those who are "disabled" as defined by the Court.175
B. Legislative Impact
In championing the plain meaning of the ADA, the Sutton decision
simultaneously handed Congress both a victory and a defeat.' 76 On one hand, the
Sutton holding championed Congress' clear legislative drafting.'77 On the other
hand, the Court failed to consider the ADA's legislative history.' 8 If the Court,
in fact, encroached upon the intent of Congress, Sutton will probably affect the
way Congress words legislation and expresses its findings in the future. 79

1999 WL 1032601, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov 12, 1999); Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946,
950(8th Cir. 1999) (holding that Plaintiffs leg brace made him substantially limited in a major life activity,
walking); Barnett v. Revere Smelting & Ref. Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 378,389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding
that defendant did not correctly apply the holding in Sutton); Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. City of Olathe,
Kansas, 67 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 (D. Kan. 1999).
175. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296,302 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1999); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298,312 (2d
Cir. 1999); Ivy v. Jones, 192 F.3d 514,515 (5th Cir. 1999); E.E.O.C. v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645,
653 (5th Cir. 1999); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 2000); Shipley v. City
of Univ. City, 195 F.3d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 1999); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir.
1999); Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, Arkansas, 186 F.3d 897,899 (8th Cir. 1999) McAlindin v. County
of San Diego, 192 F.2d 1226, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000); Broussard v. Univ. of Cal., at Berkeley, 192 F.3d
1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 1999); Sorensen v. Univ. of Utah Hosp., 194 F.3d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1999);
Mullins v. Crowell, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079-81 (N.D. Ala. 1999); Scott v. Estes, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1260,
1268 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280 (S.D. Ala. 1999);
Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (D. Ariz. 1999); Whitney v. Apfel, No.
C-98-1119, 1999 WL 786369, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1999); Piascyk v. City of New Haven, 64 F.
Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D. Conn. 1999); Hoffman v. Town of Southington, 62 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (D. Conn
1999); Barney v. U.S. Sugar Corp., No. 980224-Civ-FrM-19D, 1999 WL 1125038, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 17, 1999); Haiman v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 55 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890 (N.D. III. 1999); Baker v. Chi.
Park Dist., No. 98 C 4613, 1999 WL 519064, at *3 (N.D. III. July 15, 1999); Stensrud v. Szabo
Contracting Co., Inc., No. 98 C 878, 1999 WL 592110, at *6 (N.D. I11.Aug 2, 1999); United States
E.E.O.C. ex rel. Keane v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., No. 97 C 3971, 1999 WL 977072, at *3 (N.D. I11.
Oct. 22, 1999); Llante v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 3091, 1999 WL 1045219, at *6 (N.D.
I11.Nov. 15, 1999); Marasovich v. Prairie Material Sales, No. 98 C 2070, 1999 WL 1101244, at *5 (N.D.
III. Dec. 1, 1999); Tzoumis v. Tempel Steel Co., No. 96 C6945, 1999 WL 1101257, at *10 (N.D. II1.Dec.
1, 1999); Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (C.D. Ill. 1999); Ortega v. Southwest
Airlines Co., No. Civ.A.98-2782, 1999 WL 1072543, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 24, 1999); Hurley v. Modern
Cont'l Const. Co., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 85,93 (D. Mass. 1999); Dickerson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No.
Civ.A. 3:95-CV-2143D, 1999 WL 966430, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct 21, 1999); Todd v. Academy Corp., 57
F. Supp. 2d 448,452 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Real v. City of Compton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 531,537,541 (Ct. App.
1999); Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv., Inc., No. 01 A01-9809CV00459, 1999 WL 767597, at *1 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999).
176. See supra notes 78-111 and accompanying text.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See Harris, supra note 40, at 603.
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Sutton discernibly deviated from judicial precedent regarding the
interpretation of anti-discrimination statutes drafted and passed by Congress. "s0
The Court has uniformly given remedial legislation a broad construction in the
past. ' This deviation from the norm maybe justified because the ADA is a vastly
different statute than other civil rights statutes. 182 In cases concerning other civil
rights statutes, it is quite clear as to whether the claimant is afforded the
enumerated statutory protections, such as with age discrimination protection, a
plaintiff is either fifty years old or not.'83 The ADA, however, "contemplates a
softer, individualized, case-by-case inquiry to determine whether a particular
impairment substantially limits a major life activity."'" It should be noted,
however, that the ADA is necessarily a more fact sensitive species of civil rights
protection because the rights and degree of protection afforded to disabled
individuals has been a legislative and judicial conundrum for the better part of this
century.185
Beyond denying the claimants a broad reading of the statute, the Sutton
holding also excludes individuals that both the House and Senate sought to include
in the ADA's protected class, as evidenced by the House and Senate Reports.'86
The aforesaid inconsistencies regarding Sutton presumably will cause Congress
to exercise a greater degree of care in researching and conveying the intent of
proposed legislation. 187 Because Congress is the branch of our government with
the power to make laws, if the legislators in Washington feel that their intent was
impaired by the aggrandizement of the Court in the Sutton ruling, Congress
should affirmatively exercise its power to amend the language in the ADA in order
to sufficiently carry out congressional intent.
Justice Stevens' dissent can be read as encouraging Congress to amend the
ADA statute in favor of the EEOC guidelines.188 Recent congressional and judicial
history supports Justice Stevens' position and the possibility of an ADA

180. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 417,503-06 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 505 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. See David A. Skidmore, Jr., Mitigating Measures and the ADA UPS Caught in a Split Between
the Circuits,45 FED. LAWYER 36, 39 (Nov.-Dec. 1998).
183.

See id.

184. See id.
185. The first time the rights of the disabled became a major legislative question was in 1920. The FessKenyon Act of 1920,41 Stat. 735, was the first major legislation to challenge the then prevailing notion that
a disability equated to a lifelong economic dependency. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(I), pt. 3, at 25 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,448.
186. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,498-506 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See Harris, supra note 40, at 604.
188. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495-513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

amendment by Congress in the near future. 89
' In 1989, the Court issued decisions
gutting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited employers from
discriminating based on race, gender, national origin or religion, Congress
answered directly by issuing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as remedial
legislation."g

Conversely, if Congress intended to protect only 43,000,000 disabled
Americans under the ADA, the Sutton holding is a triumph in concise legislative
drafting. 9' In either scenario, Congress certainly will have to reexamine its
drafting techniques, due to the disparate and dire consequences in producing
legislation wherein congressional intent is latently ambiguous and thus not
clear.' 9
The Supreme Court raised the bar on the definition of disability
with its ruling in Sutton. Whether or not Sutton is consistent with the intention
of Congress in passing the ADA is a question for Congress to resolve, either
through silence or corrective legislation.
C. Social Impact
In the private sector, where the ADA functions to protect those who have
substantially limiting impairments from employment discrimination, business and
management groups are cheering the Sutton Court's interpretation of the term
"disability."' 93 The Society for Human Resource Management proclaimed the
Court's ruling a "victory for employers and employees alike," adding that "[t]he
Court's principled, common-sense approach will facilitate employers' compliance
with the Americans with Disabilities Act, while also protecting those persons who
are truly disabled whom Congress intended the ADA to protect."'" With few
resources to accommodate physically limited employees, employers agree that
impaired individuals who are not truly disabled should not usurp ADA protection
from those who are disabled.' 95

189. See ADA COMPLIANCE GUIDE: SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S JUNE 1999 ADA
DECISIONS 1,4 (Thompson Publishing Group, 1999) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE GUIDE].
190. See id. (stating that even if the federal law is not altered in the future, state laws might be able to
cure the now narrow definition of disability); see also infra note 218 and accompanying text.
191. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-87; see also Counce, supra note 164, at 1233 (noting that it is
doubtful that Congress intended to allow almost any myopic Plaintiff to show a substantial limitation in the
major life activity of seeing, which would enable them to recover under the ADA).
192. See Harris, supra note 40, at 603.
193. See Williams, supra note 172 (reporting the effects of the holding on the day of the Supreme
Court's decision in Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson 's).
194.

COMLIANCEGUIDE, supra note 189, at 5.

195.
See U.S. Supreme Court Narrows Reach of Disability Law, (June 22, 1999)
<http://legalnews.findlaw.com/scripts/legalnews> (reporting that business groups warned the Court not to
dramatically expand the scope of the ADA because they did not want to be exposed to unnecessary
lawsuits). Sutton gives employers the leverage to fire an employee who is impaired, but does not permit
impaired individuals to reach the merits of their discrimination claim without being dismissed at the
threshold question: whether they are disabled under the ADA. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 508-13 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see also Williams, supra note 172 (stating that the Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's results
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On the other hand, disability rights activists are enraged by the Supreme
Court's decision and Sutton will likely spur them to lobby Congress to amend the
disability laws as they now stand.'96 Activists are complaining that "the Court
created a 'devastating hole in the ADA."" 97 Although the Court in Sutton relied
in part on a law review article written by Robert Burgdorf Jr., the author of the
original ADA bill introduced to Congress in 1988, Burgdorf stated that he was
"disappointed that this major civil rights law ...was being interpreted in a very
narrow, technical and uninformed way" by the Court.'98 Burgdorf s accusation is
founded partly in the Court's textual reading of Congress' numerical findings,
which suggest that exactly 43,000,000 slots protect America's disabled, leaving
no room for error.'" If the Court intends to steadfastly adhere to this requirement,
disabilities more "substantially limiting" than poor vision and hypertension may
be excluded in the future." ° The Court may have commenced a slide down the
slippery slope of exclusion with the perceived narrow holding of the Sutton case.2 '
If Congress strongly feels that the laws, which they drafted and passed, were
unnecessarily infringed upon by the Court's ruling in Sutton, legislation should be
introduced to overturn and amend the Supreme Court's view of disabilities.
The ruling in Sutton may also invite open warfare on the EEOC regulations
from a management standpoint because the Court decided that the EEOC
regulations and interpretive guidance were not entitled to due deference.2" For

produce the absurd result that a person might be disabled enough to be fired from a job, but not disabled
enough to challenge the firing in court).
196. See COMPLIANCE GUIDE,supra note 189, at 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. Burgdorf also stated that he thought the law deserved more understanding than the majority
in Sutton afforded it. See id. "I don't think the Court realizes that they've gutted the law. I would be even
more disappointed if they did realize that." Id.
199. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Court's narrow approach
may have the effect of denying coverage to a sizeable portion of the 43,000,000 because the Court failed
to consider the ADA Committee Reports).
200. See Williams, supranote 172 (reporting that the holding in Sutton produced an absurd outcome).
Nevertheless, the Court may be right on the mark concerning a strict reading of Congressional
findings: "Asthe world's population grows older and experiences more widespread age-related impairments
and as new impairments and diseases surface, more individuals will qualify as having disabilities even
though medical science is simultaneously discovering new ways to manage and cure such impairments."
Harris, supranote 40, at 600.
201. See Arlene Mayerson,Amicus Briefin Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (last visited Nov. 8,1999)
<http://www.dredf.org/amicus.html> (concluding that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous and
should be broadly construed with help from the explicit legislative history).
202. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-81 ("No agency.., has been given authority to issue regulations
implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA... which fall outside Titles I-V.").

example, the Court questioned working as a major life activity.20 3 The EEOC
believes that the decision in Sutton inappropriately narrows the scope of the law
for people who are disabled and deserve protection under the ADA." 4 Therefore,
this dismissal of the EEOC interpretive authority ultimately could work against
employers and employees alike by forcing confusion as to what the guiding
definitions should be when making complex disability determinations.2 5
Moreover, the Sutton holding arguably provides a disincentive for impaired
individuals to correct their impairment if mitigating measures provide a complete
remedy.2" The Supreme Court's opinion seems only to address correctable
disabling conditions that employees choose to correct, and neglects to discuss
correctable disabling conditions that employees choose not to correct. 20 7 Even
though the Court clearly did not intend this scenario in its textual holding, this
glaring oversight would afford greater ADA protection to correctable disabling
conditions left uncorrected than to those that are corrected. 0 8 Unfortunately,
however, if the Supreme Court's analysis is applied literally, it could produce this
absurd result.' 9 Individuals who do not attempt to remedy their disabilities may

203. See COMPLIANCEGUIDE, supra note 189, at 5; see also Duston, supranote 156 (mentioning Sutton
and Hinton did not allege they were impaired in the major life activity of seeing, instead, they alleged a
limitation in the activity of working).
204. See COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 189, at 3 (noting the EEOC's disappointment in the Sutton
decision).
205. Some EEOC critics think that confusion over EEOC deference should be remedied by encouraging
the EEOC to soften some of its more extreme positions on employment. See Thomas G. Hungar, A ClearSighted View of the ADA, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1999, at A22. If they do not, critics postulate, "the
business community faces a long and expensive battle against the government's efforts to use the ADA to
transform the American workplace in ways that few members of Congress envisioned they enacted the law."
Id. at 2.
206. See Harris, supra note 40, at 600 (realizing that "malingerers" may be a potential cost of
recognizing mitigating measures by encouraging some individuals to stop investing in the management of
their maladies so they can qualify for protection).
Under-investment in the ability to mitigate a disability carries with it disincentives as well. See
id. Conducting a cost/benefit analysis, if the cost of living with an unmitigated, yet correctable,
substantially limiting impairment outweighs the benefits of ADA protection, then those individuals will not
manipulate the system. Seeid. Any incentive to keep substantially limiting impairments unmitigated could
prove fatal when considering the effects of certain physical and mental impairments, such as epilepsy or
hypertension.Economics might factor into the analysis as well. See id. For example, an individual who has
a correctable impairment, but cannot afford to purchase mitigating measures, justly is considered disabled
under Sutton. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. A similar individual who can afford
mitigating measures, however, will not want to invest in a remedy because he is no longer substantially
limited in a major life activity.
207.
See Phil Milsk, Supreme Court Supports Community Based Placements, at
http://www.thearcofil.org/ govt/g062399.html (last visited Nov. 8, 1999) (opining that the issue of
correctable conditions is far from over and will be litigated for quite some time).
208. See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) ("Because the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in
the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as requiring that a person
be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to demonstrate adisability.").
209. See Jonathan A. Segal, The Sutton Ruling: More Than Meets the Eye, 44 HR MAG. 1, (July 21,
1999).
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have more legal protection than those who do.2"' This problem, however, may
have been adequately remedied by both the Court's proposed individualized
inquiry into the question of disability, and the decision that an impairment
constitutes a disability only if it is substantially limiting.21 The majority opinion
also recognizes that, in certain cases, the use of medication may actually turn an
insubstantial impairment into a substantial impairment that is covered under the
ADA, thus assisting employees." 2
Nevertheless, critics of the Sutton decision believe that the Court's simple
solution will further occlude disability determinations for employers and
employees.2"3 Employers should beware of employees who use mitigating
measures that improve, but do not completely ameliorate, their medical
conditions. 14 If such individuals continue to be substantially limited in a major
life activity, they are still disabled under the law.215 Employers ultimately must be
cautious in determining through a case-by-case inquiry whether or not an
employee is substantially limited in a major life activity so as to avoid all liability.
When he signed the ADA into law, former President George Bush proclaimed the
ADA an "historic new civil rights Act . . . the world's first comprehensive
'
Bush added that with the
declaration of equality for people with disabilities."216
signing of the ADA, "every man, woman, and child with a disability can now pass
though the once-closed doors into a bright new era of equality, independence, and
freedom."2 7 The Sutton decision redefined the rights and protection given to
impaired individuals under the ADA. With its decision, the Court may have
slammed the doors of equality on the disabled by narrowly construing the language
of the ADA because Americans with disabilities are uniquely underprivileged and

210. Id.; see also Part VI.
211. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
212. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83 (stating that both the positive and negative effects of mitigating
measures must be taken into effect when judging whether an individual is substantially limited); see also
Timothy S. Bland, The Supreme Court Focuseson the ADA, 44 HR MAG. 12, (Sept. 1,1999) (stating that
medications may not only prevent someone from being disabled, they may also cause a disability).
Employers must examine this portion of the Court's ruling closely. See id. For example, suppose an
employee has cancer, but the individual feels fine at this point. His or her medical condition is not yet a
disability. If this individual undergoes chemotherapy and the person becomes so limited in the major life
activity of working or another, this individual is now disabled under the ADA-not because of the effects
of the cancer, but because of the effects of the treatment of the cancer. See id.
213. See COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 189, at 5.
214. See Bland, supra note 212, at 5.
215. See id.
216. Burgdorf, supra note 95, at413-14 n.3 (quoting President George Bush, Remarksby thePresident
During Ceremony for the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,2 (July 26, 1990), onfile
with the HarvardCivil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
217. Id.

disadvantaged."' The practical ramifications of Sutton in the workplace, however,
remain to be seen.
The Court's decision in Sutton will upset those who believe a broad
construction of the term disability is necessary to protect impaired individuals in
the workplace, while those who prefer a plain reading of the statute will embrace
the ruling as a deterrent to excessive litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

Imagine that a school district hires two new elementary school teachers. Both
teachers are qualified and both suffer from similar cases of clinical depression.
One of the teachers, Tim, chooses to take anti-depressant medicine, which corrects
the depression completely. James, the other teacher, decides not to take antidepressants. Under Sutton, if the school district fires Tim because of his clinical
depression, Tim has no legal recourse because presently he is not disabled under
the ADA. Under Sutton's individualized inquiry, however, if James were fired for
his depression he would have standing to sue because he is substantially limited
in a number of major life activities.
After nine years of uncertainty following the enactment of the ADA, the
Sutton decision has medicated the ADA by providing lower courts with a rule
determining the definition of disability. The impact of this decision is decidedly
uncertain; however, what has been made certain by Sutton is that individuals with
physical or mental impairments who feel that theyhave been discriminated against
by an employer must closely inspect the language of the ADA before filing a
disability discrimination claim under the statute." 9

IAN D. THOMPSON 220

218. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 31 (1990) reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4079,4312 (quoting
Humphrey Taylor).
219. Employees who cannot allege a disability under the ADA should examine his or her state law
remedies, which often have a much broader standard for disability than the one supplied by Sutton. See
Todd J. Krouner and Joshua A. Marcus, Asthma as Disability:Allowed UnderADA but JudicialRelief
Elusive, 222 N.Y.L.J. 1 See Jonathan A. Segal, The Sutton Ruling: More Than Meets the Eye, 44 HR
MAGAZINE I, at 4-5 (1999); see also supra note 190 and accompanying text.
220. J.D. Candidate 2001.

